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end it led to a continual expansion of the supply of oil from countries outside the oil cartel, since the much more expensive development of the oil fields in the North Sea or Alaska was profitable under these price conditions. In addition, in recent years the development costs of new oil deposits has been considerably reduced by innovative technologies, so that even at an oil price of US $15-17 per barrel oil can be won from the North Sea at a profit?
On the demand side the increasing taxation of energy and the promotion of energy saving in the industrial countries led to stagnation in the demand for oil. Oil consumers, however, seldom profited from the worldwide fall in oil prices. The increased world supply combined with the slower growth in demand (to an increasing degree from the growth region of Asia) is reflected in OPEC's continually sinking share of world production to its present 39%. It is therefore also improbable that OPEC will achieve its aim of a price of $ 21 per barrel in the near future. With a production figure of over 8.0 million barrels per day A detailed analysis of Oman's structural problems is to be found in: World Bank: Sultanate Oman -Sustainable Growth and Economic Diversification, World Bank Report No. 12199-OM (31.5.94) . A brief summary is to be found in: Robin Allen: Oman warned: cut spending or face economic upheaval, in: Financial Times, 4.11.94. As the study was based on a World Bank mission in spring 1993, some of the recommendations of the World Bank had already been put into effect before their publication in Autumn 1994. This is true in particular for the reduction of the budget deficit to a planned 4% of GDP in 1994 and various privatisation projects.
2 For example, the estimated cost of production of British North Sea oil is US $12 -15 and of Nowegian US $14 -17. For Saudi Arabia, however, it is only US $1 -2 per barrel. This cost calculation includes a return of 15%. Oil fields in the USA, with the exception of Alaska and offshore fields, cannot be exploited profitably at a price of less than US $ 25 per barrel. Cf. Thomas R. Stauffer: Trends in oil production costs in the Middle East, elsewhere, in: Oil & Gas Journal, 21.3.94, 
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(mbd) and an additional production potential of approximately 2.0 mbd, Saudi Arabia dominates the oil cartel and is thus able to have a stabilising effect on short-term fluctuations in supply and demand.
In addition, the OPEC is confronted by its 12 members' lax observation of the quotas. By now almost all of these countries produce at the upper ceiling of their quotas in order to avoid having to accept a reduction in the latter (and thus of their national revenue) in the next round of negotiations. Tensions in connection with the determination of quotas are apparent in the case of Kuwait (restoration of the original quota parity with the UAE to a present 2.161 mbd) and the return of Iraq to the world oil market. If the UN sanctions against Iraq were lifted the OPEC would have to integrate about 10% of its present output into its sales volume. It is not to be expected, however, that Iraq will enter onto the scene as an oil exporter worth mentioning (3 mbd maximum) before 1996/97. The tight budgetary situation in all of the member states will make the negotiations on the apportionment of the Iraqi production quota more difficult. A failure to reach agreement could lead to Iraq's leaving the OPEC.
The Gulf states' high degree of dependence on oil price trends and on the latter's volatility is illustrated by the high shares of oil in total exports as well as in government revenue. Even the relatively oil-poor Bahrain records a share of exports and government revenue of two thirds? The fall in prices during the last two years and their stabilisation at a low level led to clear strains on the budgets of the Gulf states. For Saudia Arabia, with a GDP of $ 1 2 3 bn. (1994) the dominant economic power in the region, a fall in oil prices of $ 1 per barrel means a reduction in government revenue of around $ 3 bn. This has caused the per capita income of the Saudis to fall by almost half since 1981 to $ 7,400 (1994).
Rising Budget Deficits
With the exception of the United Arab Emirates, the falling government revenues led to a marked increase in budget deficits in 1993. Apart from the special case of Kuwait (reconstruction) the deficit is approximately 10% of GDR Even Bahrain (which had a deficit of only 5% in 1994) will advance into this category this year because of the probable suspension of budget subsidies of $ 50 m. each from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.' In the meantime the governments are of course first of all attempting to reduce overall government expenditure. Thus Saudia Arabia announced a 20% reduction for 1994 and Qatar and Oman one of 10%. s There are enough starting-points for a general examination of the structure of government expenditure and revenue: until now the Gulf states have been able to strengthen the stability of their feudal social system by means of an extremely generous social policy. In addition to the exemption from personal taxes, with the exception of luxury goods virtually all goods and services have been kept 3 For Saudi Arabia oil exports in 1993 were US $ 39.6 bn, or 88% of total exports and 80% of government revenue; UAE: oil exports US $ 16.5 bn. or 75% of total exports and 83% of government revenue; Kuwait: oil exports US $10 bn. or 95% of total exports and 90% of government revenue; National statistics; NCB Economist. 5 (1993) In the case of Saudi Arabia in addition to the official foreign exchange reserves shown, the complete covering of cash in circulation by foreign exchange to the tune of US $11 bn. must be taken into account. ~ Following the reconstruction boom of 1992-1993, real Kuwaiti economic growth this year again approaches that of the other Gulf states at a rate of 3%. S o u rce s : IMF; International Institute for Strategic Studies; national statistics; own estimates.
inexpensive with the aid of government subsidies. 6
The abandonment of this luxury, i.e. for example increases in the charges for electricity, water or communal waste disposal up to the level at which they would cover costs, is a politically delicate issue which, however, is now not only being discussed openly but has actually been introduced since the 
Increased Drawing on Foreign Assets
Saudi Arabia has lived with annual budget deficits for over 10 years, but it is only since the Gulf war, which also made a large hole in the balance of payments with a record deficit of $ 27.6 bn. (1991) , that the government has been forced to an ever increasing degree to resort to domestic credits or to reduce its foreign assets. The extent to which the Gulf states have drawn on their foreign assets can be seen in the reduction in the net balances of the Arabian banks and of the nonbanking sector at foreign commercial banks within the last three and a half years. At $ 30 bn. Saudi Arabia's c o n s u m p t i o n s h o w e d the greatest absolute figure, although in S e p t e m b e r 1994 its gross assets still stood at $ 54.2 bn., of which less than half were held by the n o n -b a n k i n g sector. Relatively speaking, Bahrain's position worsened most, with net liabilities of $ 650 m. ~2 The qualification must be made, however, that in this examination it w a s impossible to take into account an estimate of the portfolio asset position due to the lack of data. An indication of the a p p r o x i m a t e size can nevertheless be obtained from the sum of the accumulated net portfolio investments of the last 20 years. Oman placed a syndicated loan of $ 300 m. for international subscription. 16 The fact that it was over-,5 A sign of financial pressure can be seen in the syndicated loan of $1.3 bn. which the government had to take out at local banks in summer 1994. Cf. Saudi Arabia, M EED Special Report, 11.11.94, pp. 42-43. In autumn 1994 the imposition of strict criteria on short-term export credit insurance by NCM Credit Insurance, a leading international insurance company, also caused unease in trade with Saudi Arabia. Cf. Roger Matt hews : Insurer restricts business with Saudi Arabia, in: Financial Times, 26. 10. 94. This appears to have been a solo event until now, however, although shortly beforehand the US Secretary of the Treasury, Lloyd Bentsen, had publicly pointed out that the Saudis had certain problems serving their debts. At the same time he called for stricter budgetary discipline. Cf. Riyadh faces debt problem, in: Financial Times, 6. 10. 94. ,6 For the first time in five years Qatar had to take out a sovereign loan of $ 250 m. to finance its balance of payments deficit in spring 1994. Also, the figures for the national budget 1994-1995 were only made known with a delay of three months in June 1994. Cf. MEED Special Report Qatar, 9. 9. 94, p. 8. The Gulf states' great dependence on crude oil is reflected in their economic structure. The production and processing of oil dominates their economies and at the same time finds its counterpart in the prominent position of state enterprises and institutions which, financed by the revenues from the oil business, offer employment to the majority of the national population (not the numerous "guest workers"). Oil and natural gas are each responsible for between 30% (Saudi Arabia) and 44% (Kuwait) of GDP (cf. Table 2 ). Since oil is a non-renewable resource, the governments have been attempting since the eighties to find other bases for their economies by expanding alternative branches of industry. This diversification, which primarily consists of the establishment of oil-processing and energy-intensive industries, has made varying degrees of progress due to differences in the "pressure of time". Whereas Saudi Arabia has, at 260 bn. barrels, approximately a quarter of all known oil deposits at its disposal, the flow of oil would appear to be going to dry up for Bahrain, and somewhat more slowly for Qatar and Oman, within the next 5 to 20 years. Their diversification projects are correspondingly ambitious: in addition to the expansion of natural gas production, the major deposits of which lie mainly in the Persian Gulf, and petrochemicals, these consist of large aluminium smelting works (Bahrain, Qatar, Oman), steel furnaces (Qatar) and the establishment of trade and banking centres (Bahrain, UAE). is Bahrain has now established itself as an international banking centre, even if the volume of assets of the offshore banking units at $ 64.5 bn. in December 1994 has not yet recovered to reach its pre-war peak of $ 72.6 bn. (1989) . 19 Dubai (UAE) has by now attracted over one billion US $ in direct investments with its free trade zone and has rapidly developed into an interregional trade centre (air and container freight). Manufacturing industry, in spite of its above-average annual growth rates, produces only about 9% of GDP in the UAE and Kuwait, while the figure for Oman is just 5%. Bahrain (15%) and Qatar (13%) are at the head of the regional league, but in their industrialisation they lie far behind the Asian NICs, and also behind Tunisia, whose manufacturing industry has a share of GDP of over 20%.2~
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The narrow scope for financial policy in the last two years led to a rethinking with regard to the economic omnipotence of the state: the future realisation of expensive infrastructure projects with private participation is being considered. The privatisation of state enterprises is also planned. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the airline Saudia and the telephone company are under discussion? 1 In Oman the state plans to withdraw completely from the hotel business.
" Euremoney ranks the country risk of the Arabian countries among a total of 162 countries as follows: UAE (32), Bahrain (38), Saudi Arabia (36), Kuwait (37), Qatar (41) and Oman (43). The Institutional Investor ranks them only slightly differently in a sample of 134 countries: UAE (29), Saudi Arabia (32), Qatar (35), Kuwait (36), Bahrain (38) and Oman (39). Cf. Country Risk, in: Euromoney, March 1995, pp. 376-381; and Harvey D. Shapiro: before the fall, in: Institutional Investor, March 1995, pp. 125-126. 18 Roger M a t t h e w s : Quest for greater economic diversity, p.1 ; and Mark Nicholson:
Aluminium Industry -cheap power sets the pace, p. 3, in: Bahrain, Financial Times Survey, 14. 7. 92; Economic Outlook in the GCC Countries, in: NCB Economist, Vol. 4, 1994, No. 2; MEED Special Report Qatar, 9. 9. 94; David Lascelles: Oman hands big gas field to joint venture, in: Financial Times, 11.8. 94. ~g Bahrain Monetary Agency: Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 20, 1994 , No. 4, Table 18. 20 Qatar Central Bank: Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, VoI. 12 (1994 Central Bank of Oman: Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 20, 1994, No. 2, 
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REPORT At the same time the construction of the $ 6 bn. natural gas project is not to be begun until the sales (mainly to Japan) are guaranteed. In Qatar the admission of private investors to infrastructure projects is even under consideration and the communal utilities are to be privatised. But the greater involvement of private capital in enterprises which have until now belonged to the state can only be successful if these enterprises are free to determine the prices for their products. In order, at the same time, to intensify competition, the still restrictive regulations regarding foreign shareholdings would have to be relaxed. Progress in these areas is slow, however. This is reflected, so to speak, in the openness of the Arabian share markets: Saudi Arabia's stock exchange has the highest market capitalisation at $ 38 bn. in 1994 (cf. Table 3 ), but at the same time, however, it is completely closed to investors outside of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Since 41% of the share capital are in the hands of the state, only the remaining 59% are de facto tradable, of which only a small share for investors from other Gulf states. In addition, the liquidity of the Saudi Arabian stock exchange is low, for in 1994 the trade volume was only 17.5% of the total shares volume. Bahrain, in contrast, allows open access to its stock exchangewith certain restrictions (e.g. a one percent maximum share of any individual investor in a particular enterprise). Kuwait and Oman have also allowed access to a limited degree. 22 Following a boom year for the Saudi Arabian exchange of +92% in 1991, in 1992/1993 stagnation set in and last year there was a slump of -29%, which was considerably greater than the trend in the real economy (GDP shrinkage of approximately 1% in 1994). 23 In order to support the development of the regional capital market, in addition to the facilitation of access for foreign capital the listing of bonds and shares in all the Gulf state stock exchanges would have to be made possible. Bahrain and Oman were the first to begin, in March 
Creeping Democratisation
Following the Gulf war, Kuwait set a standard in October 1992 with the election of the first Arabian parliament -although with limited suffrage -which the surrounding sheikhdoms have imitated only hesitantly. In the same year the Emir of Bahrain appointed an advisory assembly with 30 members, which was to be upvalued due to public protest in December 1994. The Consultative Council consisting of 60 advisors which was initiated a year earlier by the Saudi Arabian King only has the right to be heard and to make recommendations, and cannot therefore be considered equal to a legislative assembly, but it puts its advisory role to very constructive use. Through this advisory body opinions and suggestions from outside are now increasingly taken into account during the preparation phase of government work. 2' Progress towards closer regional cooperation is slow due to a certain mistrust on the part of the small sheikhdoms towards the regionally dominant power of Saudi Arabia. Thus, it has not yet been possible to come to an agreement on an integrated customs area. 2~ The border disputes between Qatar on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain on the other are also not yet finally settled. In practice there is not even 22 Kuwait: Residents are allowed to own shares through mutual funds in certain companies; Oman: open to foreign investors through mutual funds, up to 49% of listed companies, in: NCB Economist, Vol. 5, 1995 , No. 2, p. 10. 23 Cf. Gulf Capital Markets, in: NCB Economist, Vol. 4, 1994 , No.6, pp. 1-8 and Vol. 5, 1995 and: More of that fabled Arab Hospitality, in: Euromoney, September 1994, pp. 372-375. By the end of April 1995 the Saudi Arabian share index had fallen by a further 9%.
24 Aluminium Bahrain: MEED, 8. 4. 94, p. 19 ; the public share of the Commercial Facilities Company could be reduced in this way from 55% to 38%. Cf. Richard Lapper: Kuwaiti public offering draws strong demand, in: Financial Times, 23.9.94. 25 Mark N i c h o I s o n : Year-old Saudi "parliament" is a quiet affair, in: Financial Times, 28. 12. 94. The Sultan of Oman replaced the appointed consultative committee in 1990 by a body consisting of representatives elected in the government districts but his absolute power continues to be hardly infringed upon. Cf. Oman -eine aufgekl&rte Autokratie am Golf, in: Neue ZQrcher Zeitung, 22. 11.93.
